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WILLIAM-. AND MARY LAW REVIEW
• Contracts-Landlord: and Tenant-A'Ii, LIABILT-r, OF- RIG ft OF
FIRST REFUSAL TO JUD.CIAL SALE. In October, 1954, 0: H. Mull and his
wife leased for a tefiiIof'5 years certain property in Chase'Git);Vii-
ginia, to Cities Service Oil:Company for use as a gasoline service' sta-
•tion. Section 13 of the lease granted Cities Service the option to pur-
chase the property at any time during the term of the lease fot $45,000
and also gave the oil company a right of first refusal.' In January,
1962, 0. H. Mull died intestate survived by his wife and six children.
These heirs joined in a bill asking for a decree authorizing a sAle of
the real estate Mull owned at his death including that property under
lease to Cities Service. The chancellor concurred in a chancery com-
missioner's recommendation that the Cities Service property be sold
subject- to any leases existing against it. A public sale was held and
the highest and last bid on the property under lease to Cities Service
was made by C. E. Estes in the amount of $31,100. Cities Service filed
a petition in the Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County, Virginia, pray-
ing that the sale to Estes not be confirmed, claiming that it had a right
of first refusal in the property and thirty days in which to exercise
that right.2 Within that period the oil company notified all parties
in interest that it would purchase the property for $31,100. However,
the chancellor ruled that the right of first refusal embodied in para-
.graph two of section 13 did not apply to a judicial sale. Cities Service
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia assigning this
interpretation as error.8
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision
and permitted the lessee to exercise its right of first refusal and to pur-
L. The second paragraph of section 13 contained the provision for the right of first
refusal and read in part as follows:
In the event that the Landlord at any time during the original or extended
term hereof shall receive a bona fide offer satisfactory to it for the sale of
the above described premises ... the Landlord shall give the Tenant written
notice of the terms and conditions of any said offer and the Tenant shall
have the option and first refusal for thirty days after receipt of such
notice within which to elect to purchase . . . on terms of said offer. If
Tenant shall elect to purchase . . . the premises pursuant to the option and
first refusal herein gzanted, it shall give written notice of such election to
the Landlord within such thirty-day period, and upon such notice being
given, the transaction shall be closed within sixty days subsequent to
Tenant's notice of election. Upon such closing the Landlord shall deliver
to Tenant . . . a full covenant warranty deed conveying a good and
marketable title, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances . ...
2. Id.
3. Cities Service Oil Company v. Estes, 208 Va. 44 (1967).
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chase the property from the special commissioners for $31,100.4 The
court based this opinion on the theory that since the right of first
refusal was placed in the lease to protect the lessee, it must be con-
strued with that intention in mind.
The issue of whether a right of first refusal can be exercised at a
judicial sale is one of first impression in Virg'nia and has been reviewed
in few other jurisdictions. There are only four cases which deal directly
with this problem.
The cases of In re Rigby's Estate5 and Draper v. Gochman stand
for the proposition that the right of first refusal is not exercisable at
a judicial sale. In the case of Rigby's Estate, the administrator for the
estate of Mason Rigby sought instructions as to the rights of bidders on
the deceased's real property being offered at public sale. When Rigby
died his interest in his real property was subject to a lease which con-
tained a provision giving the lessees the right of first refusal "on such
terms as first party (Rigby) shall then demand for the purchase price."
Pursuant to a court order the administrator put the deceased's land up
for public sale. The lessees claimed that they were entitled to pur-
chase the land at the price offered by the highest bidder. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming found that the lessees could not exercise this right
at judicial sale, since "there could be no offer that would create the xight
of first -refusal until the price had been .fixed in the manner pre-
scribed." 7
In Draper the Supreme Court of Texas held that the "desires to sell"
term within the clause of the lease giving the tenant the right of first
refusal covered only voluntary acts of the landlord. The right 'did not
-7
4. Other issues decided by the lower court are not contested on appeal. The appellee
does not question that the Mull heirs are bound by the subject lease. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-682, 8-701 (1950). There is also no contention that the chancellor was incorrect
in his differentiation between the option to purchase in paragraph one of section 13
and the right of first refusal in the second paragraph of that section.
A right of first refusal is distinguished from an absolute option in that the
former does not entitle the lessee to compel an unwilling owner to sell.
Instead it requires the owner when and if he decides to sell, to offer the
property first to the person entitled to the right of first refusal.
Id. at 47; accord, Barling v. Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94 (Mo., 1956). See generally, '32
AAT. Jtm. Landlord & Tenant § 299 (1941); 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 19.1
Cum. Supp. (1967).
5. 62 Wyo. 401, 167 P.2d 964 (1946).
6. 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966) reversing 389 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
7. The court held that the Rigby heirs were the only parties which could set a
price that would make the right of first refusal operational; but since the heirs had
not been ascertained, the condition precedent to the right could not be fulfilled.
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apply to a judicial sale upon foreclosure of a deed of trust, since the
landlord did not express a willingness or desire to accept an offer from
a third party.
The two cases the appellant Cities Service relies upon, McCarter v.
York County Loan Company" and Price v. Towm of Ruston,9 espouse
the opposite view. The Canadian court in McCarter held that a lessee's
right of first refusal applied to a sale negotiated by a liquidator ap-
pointed to wind up the lessor company's affairs. In the Price case, the
owner of a lot preparin'g to construct a two-story building thereon
entered into an agreement with the local chapter of the Order of
Elks by which the lodge was permitted to construct a third story on
the building for use as its meeting hall. The contract contained a clause
giving the owner the right of first refusal in the event the lodge "shall
desire to sell" the third story. The lodge had borrowed money for
construction and secured the loan by a mortgage on the third story.
When the chapter defaulted on the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed
and the property sold at public sale to the Town of Ruston as highest
bidder. The owner's heirs tendered the amount of the highest bid, but
it was refused. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the word
"desire" should be construed liberally as conferring the right to pur-
chase when about to sell and that the first right to purchase entitles the
optionee to take property at the highest bid at a sheriff's sale. The court
concluded that:
Our opinion is that one' of the main purposes of the option was to -
'save Mrs. Price [the owner] and her heirs and assigns from the
danger, in case of a forced sale, of having to bid an exorbitant
,price to prevent any one else, other than the Elk's lodge, from
owning the third floor of the Price building, and from occupy-
ing the space free of rent.10
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed with the reasoning
of the Louisiana court in Price. It rejected the argument that the
exercise of the right of first refusal at a judicial sale would depress the
bidding by saying that it does not logically follow that the holder of
the right would exercise it at every opportunity, since in many in-
stances he may elect not to buy because he deems the final bid to be
too high. It also refused to accept Estes' contention that the requirement
8. 14ONr. L.R. 420 (1907).
9. 171 La. 985,132 So. 653 (1931).
10. Id. at 132 So. 656.
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of paragraph two of section 13 that the lessor furnish a general warranty
deed indicated that the parties excluded a judicial sale where only a
special warranty deed would be executed. 1 The court stated, "Since a
right of first refusal is inserted in a lease for the benefit of the lessee,
we must interpret it with that purpose in mind." 1
The position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals appears to be
the better of the two views on the subject, since it is not based solely
on the technicalities of the specific lease as are the decisions in Draper
and Rigby's Estate. Since none of the leases or facts in the cases con-
sidered above are precisely the same, the conflict of authority may not
be as great as it first appears.'3 The decision of the Virginia high court
giving the lessee the protection he has bargained for is a just one and
should be adopted as the preferred view when other jurisdictions con-
sider this question.
Ion W. Bruce
Tort-CONTRBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-FAILURE TO ATTACH SEAT BELTS.
On July 25, 1964, the plaintiff, Singleton, a guest in an automobile driven
by defendant, Cierpisz was seriously injured when the defendant col-
lided with another automobile on a country road in Maryland. Al-
though seat belts were installed in the automobile at the time of the
accident, neither party had them fastened. Plaintiff brought an action
for damages based on defendant's negligence in operating the auto-
mobile. The trial court held for the plaintiff and the defendant ap-
pealed, noting as error the trial court's failure to submit to the jury
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence in not attaching her
seat belt.
11. Supra note 1.12. 'Cities Service Oil Company v. Estes, 208 Va. at 49; accord, First National Bank
v. Roanoke Oil Company, 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764 (1937).
13. The particular facts of the instant case might cause the Texas and Wyoming
courts to reach a decision similar to that of the Supreme Court of Appeali of Virginia.
The Texas court in Draper based its opinion on the fact that the lease permitted the
right of first refusal to be used only wherever the landlord had a desire to sell. In the
present case the right of first refusal clause was exercisable in the event the Landlord
at any time during the term of the lease "received a bona fide offer satisfactory to it
for the sale of the above described premises." The heirs of O.H. Mull were satisfied
with the price the property brought at judicial and did not file a brief on appeal. The
Texas court would be hard put to find that that clause of the lease was not fulfilled.
Also, the fact that the heirs had accepted the price would destroy the foundation for
the decision in Rigby's Estate, since it could be said that the heirs had set the price
by asking for the sale and accepting the final bid.
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